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Abstract
After patent expirations in pharmaceutical markets, brand-name lab-
oratories are threatened by generic rmsentry. To ll the gap in the
theoretical literature on this topic, we study brand-name rms incen-
tives either to deter entry, or to merge with the entrant. These strategies
are considered along with the possibility of the brand-name rm produc-
ing its own generic drug, called a pseudo-generic drug. Using a vertical
di¤erentiation model with Bertrand-Stackelberg competition, we show
that each strategy, merging and deterring entry, may be Nash equilib-
rium, according to the generic rms setup cost level and to the rate of
discount.
JEL Classications: I11, L12.
Key words: barriers, endogenous mergers, limit pricing, pharmaceu-
ticals, pseudo-generics.
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1 Introduction
In pharmaceutical markets, drug producers apply for patents in order to pro-
tect their intellectual property rights. At the patent expiration dates, these
rights become public property. Then, princeps copying is allowed and incum-
bents are threatened by generic rmsentry. These generic laboratories pro-
duce drugs bio-equivalent1 to branded goods. Some companies see more than
20% of their sales threatened by competition2 from generic drugs (Grandls et
al., 2004). Therefore, they have incentives either to merge with generic rms,
or to deter their entry in order to preserve their monopoly power. We study
the trade-o¤ between these practices to ll the gap in theoretical literature on
this topic.
These strategies are considered along with the possibility of the brand-
name rm producing its own generic drug, called a pseudo-generics good.
Recently, pseudo-generics production became signicant3. Therefore, econo-
mistsinterest in the e¤ect of pseudo-generics is recent, both at an empirical
and theoretical level. Empirically, original studies of Hollis (2002, 2003) ana-
lyze the e¤ects of these drugs on prices and generic entry. The author shows
the presence of a rst mover advantage. This advantage deters entry and leads
to an increase in price, both for pseudo-generics and brand-name products. He
concludes that the welfare decreases in the Canadian market. These results
1Generic drugs are manufactured with the same molecules as the brand-name drugs.
2To illustrate this competition, note that the expected global generic growth is about 7%
in 2006 (IMS-Health). Caves and al. (1991), Frank and Salkever (1997), Morton (1999, 2000)
analyze generic entry e¤ects on princeps prices and market shares in the United-States.
3For instance, pseudo-generics have about one quarter of the generic market in Australia
and Canada. They are also in a strong position in New Zealand, Germany, the UK, and
Sweden (Hollis 2002).
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corroborate the Ferrandiz theoretical model. In a complementary approach,
Kong et Seldon (2004) use a two-stage game model with product di¤erentia-
tion and show the central role of cross price-elasticity in using pseudo-generic
products to deter entry. Pseudo-generics drugs, by raising competitive pres-
sure on the generic rm, make entry deterrence easier. From this perspective,
Granier and Trinquard (2006) show that this increase in competitive pressure
facilitates the generic rms purchase by the brand-name laboratories. This
justies our present study i.e. the trade-o¤ between mergers and barriers to
entry in pharmaceutical markets.
Regarding barriers to entry, this model considers the limit-pricing strate-
gies that consist of xing the highest price that insures that the entrant realizes
no prot4. A basic defect in the Bain/sylos limit-pricing model of entry de-
terrence stems from its assumption that the potential entrant believes that
the established rm would maintain its output constant if entry occurred. The
problem is that if entry did occur it would not generally be rational for the es-
tablished rm to carry out this threat; thus the threat is not credible (see, e.g.,
Sherer, 1980, pp.246-48). Considering asymmetric information in a Bayesian
game, Milgrom and Roberts (1982) solves the credibility problem. Even if this
new model can qualify the e¢ cacy of the limit-pricing strategy, in a compro-
mise between generality and tractability, we assume generic rms are myopic
producers. Regarding mergers, we construct a model of endogenous mergers
(see, e.g., Kamien and Zang, 1990, 1993, Granier, 2007) to better consider
merger dynamics. More exactly, we study preemptive mergers. These are
4 In particular, the limit-pricing strategy is empirically validated by Sengupta ( 1983 ) for
US computer industry.
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initiated to prevent an unfavorable future event such as certain rival mergers
(Brito, 2003, Fridolfsson and Stennek, 2005), or in our case, such as the generic
entry.
The purpose of this paper is to study the trade-o¤ between a limit-pricing
strategy and a merger strategy. To achieve this aim, we develop a simple model
in which a brand-name laboratory and a generic one compete à la Bertrand-
Stackelberg in a therapeutic market with vertically di¤erentiated goods. We
nd two main results. The limit-pricing strategy is always preferable to accom-
modating entry but the generic rm myopic assumption qualies this result.
Secondly, merger is preferable to entry deterrence depending on the entrant
setup cost level and to the discount rate. Our paper extends Kong and Sel-
don (2004), and Granier and Trinquard (2006) models. Indeed, it studies the
trade-o¤ between entry deterrence and merger, also taking into account the
possibility of pseudo-generic production. Moreover, it di¤ers from these two
models by assuming price competition. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 sets out the model. In section 3, we analyze limit-pricing
strategies. Section 4 is devoted to merger analysis and to its comparison with
that of limit-pricing strategies. We conclude in section 5.
2 Model
We consider a drug market where the patent has expired. Thus, generic labora-
tories are able to produce. We take into account the fact that the brand-name
rm can equally produce a pseudo-generic. Consumers may choose between
a brand-name product and a generic product. The brand-name producer,
threatened by the generic entry, may adopt three alternative strategies: either
4
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accommodate entry or deter entry or merge as soon as a generic rm enters
the market. We dene a game in which these three strategies are available. By
comparing prots associated with these three strategies, we compute the Nash
equilibrium of the game (see gure 1). First, we present the model assump-
tions. Second, we establish existence conditions of the benchmark in which
the three strategies can be analyzed.
Insert Figure 1
2.1 Assumptions
The physician is considered as a perfect agent of the patient. In this context,
the physicians utility and the patients utility are one and the same. Their
utility function is linear since we assume risk-neutral consumers. The absence
of an insurance market is also assumed, which means that consumers pay their
drugs bill in full and there is no public intervention in the market5. We assume
a vertical product di¤erentiation because of brand loyalties6 and uncertainty
5«Price regulation is mainly concerned with the trade-o¤ between R&D and cost con-
tainment, while insurance is concerned with moral hazard and adverse selection problems»
(Brekke et Kuhn 2006). Our purpose is a very di¤erent one. We examine the trade-o¤
between entry deterrence and mergers. Therefore, we do not take account of health insur-
ance and price regulation. Therefore, we do not take account of health insurance and price
regulation. However, there are papers focused on price regulation e¤ects in pharmaceutical
markets (e.g. Jones, Potashnik and Zhang, 2001).
6The empirical studies of Hudson (1992), Hellerstien (1998), or Kong (2004) show the
existence of brand loyalties. These studies explain swithching costs by the search costs and
the uncertainty about the relative quality of the entrant.
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in quality di¤erential in drugs. Consumersutility function is assumed to be:
U =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
u  pb
u  pg
0
if the patient consumes the brand-name drug,
if the patient consumes the generic drug,
otherwise.
The variable u is the drug quality, pb the brand-name price and pg the
generic price. Each consumer is characterized by a value of . This parameter
is the subjective cost of switching from the branded to the generic drug. Here,
it is modeled as a probability. It is the perceived probability that the generic
drug is of the same quality as the brand-name one. Consumption decisions are
trade-o¤s between the perceived quality of a drug and its price. The parameter
 is assumed to be uniformly distributed over the interval [0; 1]. Let F () be
the distribution function. A patient  purchases the brand-name drug if the
following is true:
u  pb  u  pg )   1  pb   pg
u
, (1)
u  pb  0) pb  u. (2)
From this, we compute market shares. Let sg be the generic market share
and sb the brand-name one:
sg = 1  F (1  pb   pg
u
) =
pb   pg
u
, (3)
sb = F (1  pb   pg
u
) = 1  pb   pg
u
. (4)
The literature on the pharmaceutical market usually assumes negligible
marginal cost and focuses on sunk costs of R&D. Here, we leave aside these
sunk costs since we do not consider innovation issues. However, the generic
laboratory pays a setup cost to enter the pharmaceutical market. Let F denote
6
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the setup cost in the rest of the paper. This is not the case for the brand-
name rm when it produces its pseudo-generic drug because the pseudo-generic
good may be manufactured on the same production lines as its brand-name
equivalent (Kong and Seldon, 2004, footnote 2). Furthermore, we assume
the brand-name producer can act as a Stackelberg leader because of brand
loyalties. Moreover, the brand-name rm and the generic rm compete à la
Bertrand7. We assume also the brand-name rm has no incentive to produce
several di¤erent pseudo-generic drugs8. Now we have dened the benchmark
conditions, we can to study the trade-o¤ between entry deterrence, accommo-
dation of entry and merger.
2.2 Benchmark conditions
In order to study the trade-o¤ between accommodating entry, deterring entry,
or purchasing the generic rm, we dene a benchmark for which entry is prof-
itable. To elucidate the topic, we restrict the study to the case in which entry
is protable if and only if the industry is monopolistic and there is only one
entry at any time9. To check this assumption, a second entrant must realize no
7Because of the xed market demand (i.e. covered market and unit density), we assume
price competition and we consider limit pricing strategy.
8There are two justications to this assumption. On one hand, brand-name laboratories
have a reluctance to produce several types of pseudo-generic drugs so as not to degrade
brand-loyalties from which they benet. Indeed, for a given therapeutic class, the generics
proliferation decreases the switching cost from the brand to the generic drug (Hurwitz and
Caves, 1988). On the other hand, we note the absence of such pseudo-generic duplication in
stylized facts.
9Results are not qualitatively modied if there are several entrants at the same time.
Indeed, if several rms simultaneously enter the market, these share equally the generic
market among themselves. Therefore, merger and entry deterrence strategies are una¤ected.
7
Page 7 of 36
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
prot. Therefore, we have to compare a duopolistic industry with a triopolis-
tic one. Given that the brand-name rm can produce two goods, we must
determine which strategy this rm follows, whether to produce only pseudo-
generic drugs or not. First, we determine if it produces pseudo-generics when
there is only one entrant. Second, we make the same study when there are
two entrants. The comparison of these two studies determines the benchmark
conditions where there is only one potential entrant at any one time.
2.2.1 Stackelberg duopoly vs Stackelberg pseudo-duopoly
To know if the brand-name laboratory has an incentive to produce a pseudo-
generic when there is only one entrant, we compare its prots with and with-
out a pseudo-generic drug. We call "pseudo-duopoly" the duopoly in which
pseudo-generics are produced. We start by analyzing the Stackelberg duopoly
before analyzing the Stackelberg pseudo-duopoly.
Stackelberg duopoly Let Db and 
D
g be brand-name and generic rms
duopoly prots. These prots are as follows:
Db = sbpb, (5)
Dg = sgpg   F . (6)
Since the brand-name laboratory acts as a Stackelberg leader, we substitute
the generic rms reaction function into the brand-name rms prot function
to compute equilibrium prices and prots. Thus, we obtain the following
equilibrium prots:
Db =
u
2
, (7)
Dg =
u
4
  F . (8)
8
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Proof. see appendix A.
Stackelberg pseudo-duopoly LetPDb and
PD
g be brand-name and generic
rmsduopoly prots. These prots are then given by:
PDb = sbpb +
1
2
sgpg, (9)
PDg =
1
2
sgpg   F . (10)
As the two generic drugs are homogeneous, the Bertrand competition leads
to a unique price on this market. Thus, the two producers share the generic
market equally among themselves. Since the brand-name laboratory acts as a
Stackelberg leader, we substitute the generic rms reaction function into the
brand-name rms prot function to establish equilibrium prices and prots.
Thus, the equilibrium prots are:
PDb =
5
8
u, (11)
PDg =
1
8
u  F . (12)
Proof. see appendix B.
Conclusion: which structure? The brand-nam laboratory compares its
prots in the two structures to decide whether or not to produce pseudo-
generics.
PDb  Db =
u
8
> 0. (13)
The brand-name rm, in competition with a generic rm, produces pseudo-
generics. We deduce from that the generic rm enters the market if and only
if it recovers its setup cost, that is if F < u8 . Now, we study the case for
which there are two entrants to dene the conditions under which a sole entry
is protable.
9
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2.2.2 Stackelberg triopoly vs Stackelberg pseudo-triopoly
We call "pseudo-triopoly" the triopoly in which pseudo-generics are produced.
Proceeding in the same way as in section 2.2.1 but with two potential entrants,
we study the brand-name rms decision to produce pseudo-generics. We start
by analyzing the Stackelberg triopoly before analyzing the Stackelberg pseudo-
triopoly.
Stackelberg triopoly Let Tb , 
T
g1, and 
T
g2 be brand-name and generic
rmstriopoly prots. These prots are as follows:
Tb = sbpb, (14)
Tg1 = 
T
g2 =
1
2
sgpg   F . (15)
Subsequently, the equilibrium prots are:
Tb =
u
2
, (16)
Tg1 = 
T
g2 =
u
8
  F . (17)
Proof. see appendix C.
Stackelberg pseudo-triopoly Let PTb , 
PT
g1 , and 
PT
g2 be brand-name
and generic rmstriopoly prots. These prots are given by:
PTb = sbpb +
1
3
sgpg, (18)
PTg1 = 
PT
g2 =
1
3
sgpg   F . (19)
The generic market is divided into three equal shares because of the reasons
mentioned in section 2.2.1. Subsequently, the prots are the following:
PTb =
7
12
u, (20)
PTg1 = 
PT
g2 =
1
12
u  F . (21)
10
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Proof. see appendix D.
Conclusion: which structure? The brand-name laboratory compares its
prots in the two structures in order to decide whether or not to produce
pseudo-generics.
PTb  Tb =
u
12
> 0. (22)
The brand-name rm, in competion with two generic rms, produces the
pseudo-generic. We deduce from this that two generic rms enter the market
simultaneously or sequentially if and only if they recover their setup costs,
that is if F < u12 . The pseudo-duopoly and the pseudo-triopoly are the market
structures preferred by the brand-name rm in the case of a sole competitor
or of two competitors respectively. By assumption, entry is protable if and
only if the initial structure is a monopolistic one and if there is an only one
entry at a time. To check this assumption, the second entrant must realize
no prot. By comparing the two structures, we ascertain the condition under
which entry is protable for one rm but not for two:
u
12
< F <
u
8
. (23)
The benchmark conditions having been studied, we focus on the deterrence
of the entry of the generic rm.
3 Entry deterrence
In this Bertrand competition context, the brand-name rm may have an in-
centive to use a limit-pricing strategy to deter entry. This strategy consists
in xing the highest price which deters entry. Since the brand-name rm can
11
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produce pseudo-generics, two sub-strategies exist. On one hand, to deter entry
by producing only the brand-name good. On the other hand, to deter entry
by producing the two drugs. We compare these two sub-strategies to ascertain
the optimal strategy. We begin with the case in which the brand-name rm
produces only its princeps. Second, we study the case in which it produces
pseudo-generics also.
3.1 Limit-pricing strategy and Stackelberg duopoly
The limit-pricing strategy consists in determining the price which maximizes
the brand-name rms prot under the assumption that the generic producer
realizes no prot:
max
pb
LDb = sbpb (24)
s=t LDg = sgpg   F  0
Since the brand-name laboratory acts as a Stackelberg leader, we substitute
the generic rms reaction function into the brand-name rms prot function
to establish equilibrium prices and prots. The reaction function is:
RF (pb) : pg(pb) =
pb
2
. (25)
The prot of the generic producer must be non-positive to deter entry.
Since the brand-name rms prot function is concave, we saturate the con-
straint so as to establish the equilibrium brand-name good price pLDb :
LDg = sg
pb
2
  F = p
2
b
4u
  F = 0 (26)
) pLDb = 2
p
Fu.
Given that the generic rm does not enter the market, the brand captures
the whole demand if pLDb < u, that is F <
u
4 . Note that if F >
u
4 , the limit
12
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price exceeds the consumers willingness to pay. The rm cannot x this price,
but in this case, the generic rm does not enter (see section 2.2.1). Thus, the
equilibrium brand-name rms prot is:
LDb = sbp
LD
b = 2
p
Fu. (27)
Under the benchmark conditions, the brand-name laboratory can deter
entry without pseudo-generics production by xing the equilibrium price pLDb .
3.2 Limit-pricing strategy and Stackelberg pseudo-duopoly
Proceeding in the same way as in the previous section, the maximization prob-
lem becomes:
max
pb
LPDb = sbpb +
1
2
sgpg (28)
s=c LPDg =
1
2
sgpg   F  0
Inserting (25) and saturating the constraint, we deduce the equilibrium
brand-name good price pLPDb :
LPDg =
1
2
sg
pb
2
  F = p
2
b
8u
  F = 0 (29)
) pLPDb = 2
p
2Fu.
Given that the generic rm does not enter the market, the brand captures
the whole demand if pLPDb < u, that is F <
u
8 . Note that if F >
u
8 , the limit
price exceeds the consumer willingness to pay. The rm cannot x this price,
but in this case, the generic producer does not enter (see section 2.2.1). Thus,
the equilibrium brand-name rms prot is:
LPDb = sbp
LPD
b + sgp
LPD
g (30)
= 2
p
2Fu  2F .
13
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This strategy is protable if the brand-name prot is positive, that is the
case if F < 2u. So, the benchmark holds if F < u8 . Thus, under the benchmark
conditions, the brand-name rm can deter entry by producing its pseudo-
generic good by xing the equilibrium price pLPDb .
3.3 Optimal limit-pricing strategy
In order to determine the optimal limit-pricing strategy, we compare brand-
name rms prots in the two sub-strategies: to produce or not pseudo-
generics. By assumption, only one generic rm has an incentive to enter the
market if condition (23) holds. Moreover, the two sub-strategies are applicable
if condition (23) holds. The di¤erence between the two prots is:
LPDb  LDb = 2
p
2Fu  2F   2
p
Fu. (31)
This expression is a trinomial which admits two roots F1 and F210. The
benchmark conditions are between these two roots. We deduce from this:
LPDb  LDb > 0. (32)
Therefore, the optimal limit-pricing strategy is that in which the brand-
name rm produces pseudo-generics. In this case, brand and generic prices
are xed at pLPDb and p
LPD
g . The brand-name rm, preventing its competi-
tor from entering the market, realizes a prot LPDb . We determine if it is
protable for the brand-name rm to deter entry. Therefore, we compare the
brand-name rms prots in the case of limit-pricing strategy and in the case
of accommodation strategy. This di¤erence is analyzed for setup cost values
in line with condition (23). Indeed, this condition makes the entry of only one
10F1 = 0 and F2 =  2u
p
2 + 3u ' 0:172u
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generic rm protable at one time. The prot di¤erence is given by:
LPDb  PDb = 2
p
2
p
Fu  2F   5
8
u > 0. (33)
Proposition 1 The limit-pricing strategy dominates the accommodation strat-
egy.
Proof. see appendix E.
As we have already said, this result assumes a myopic generic rm, since
by entering the market, this rm incites the brand-name rm to modify its
strategy by xing competitive prices.
4 Deter entry or merge?
The previous section underlines that entry deterrence strategy dominates ac-
commodation strategy. The merger strategy is equivalent to the entry deter-
rence strategy. Indeed, it prevents the generic rm from producing. After
studying the merger path, we analyze the relative protability of the two
strategies.
4.1 An alternative to entry deterrence: the "anticipative" merger
In the benchmark, we consider one potential entry in each period. Thus, we
study the merger in a dynamic context. The brand-name rm must purchase
one rm in each period. As the generic rm is bought before entering the
market, this merger is called "anticipative" merger11. This merger is equivalent
11This idea belongs to a broader concept called preemptive merger. This is studied in
endogenous merger literature. These mergers are initiated to prevent an unfavorable future
event such as certain rival mergers (see, e.g., Brito, 2003, Fridolfsson and Stennek, 2005). In
our case, the unfavorable event is a generic entry.
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to a premium paid by the brand-name rm to prevent competition. The merger
allows the brand-name producer to realize a monopoly prot. On the other
hand, this rm has to purchase each entrant. We deduce a net merger gain.
4.1.1 Monopolization
Therefore, we study the brand-name monopoly, achieved by merger. Let Mb
be the monopoly prot. This prot is the gross merger gain for one period.
Mb = sbpb +
1
2
sgpg. (34)
The monopoly can extract the whole consumer surplus by selling the most
valued drug to each consumer since the brand-name rm need not sell pseudo-
generic drugs. Therefore, the branded good is not in competition with a generic
good. It xes the branded good price level at the maximum price allowing to
sell the drug to each consumer, that is at pMb = u. Thus, s
M
b = 1. The
brand-name rms prot, which is then a mono-product monopoly prot12, is
Mb = u.
4.1.2 Buying price
According to the benchmark, only one generic rm has an incentive to enter
the monopolistic market at each period. Such an entrant must, to set up in the
market, invest in a production unit represented by a setup cost F . As soon as
the potential entrant invests, the brand-name rm tries to purchase it to stay
in a monopolistic situation. The repurchase process is a simultaneous auction
12The monopoly is a mono-product one but this must be nuanced because there is no
insurance market. Such a market would incite the monopoly to produce pseudo-generics
because of the reimbursement di¤erential if we assume a non-covered drug market. This
scenario would be more in accordance with empirical reality.
16
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mechanism. The brand-name rm bids for the generic producer and the generic
rm gives a reservation price. As the generic rm cannot hope to earn more
than the Bertrand-Stackelberg gross prot (without deducting the setup cost)
which it would realize by refusing to be sold, it gives a reservation price13
equal to this prot. By anticipating this, the brand-name rm bids at this
level, called generic rms buying price. We consider the auction mechanism
as an instantaneous one. This mechanism takes place at the moment of the
generic entry. Thus, no other rm has an incentive to enter the market since
there is already an entry at this period. Therefore, the buying price is the
actualized innite ow of gross prot the generic rm would realize by entering
the market. Let  be the discount rate with 0 <  < 1 and let BP (u; ) be the
buying price:
BP (u; ) =
PDg + F
(1  ) =
u
8
(1  ) . (35)
4.1.3 Net merger gain
Let G(F; u; ) be the net merger gain. It is equal to the gross merger gain
minus the buying price. As the game horizon is innite, the gross merger gain
is an actualized innite ow of monopoly prot. The buying price is paid in
each period because there is an entrant to purchase in each period.
G(F; u; ) =
Mb
1    
BP (u; )
1   (36)
=  1
8
u
(   1)2 (8   7) .
We nd the net merger gain is positive for  <  and negative for  > 
with  = 78 .
13This reservation price makes the generic rm indi¤erent between producing and being
sold.
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Proof. see appendix F.
4.2 "Anticipative" merger strategy vs limit-pricing strategy
To solve the game, we compare two strategies: to merge with each entrant or to
deter entry ad vitam aeternam. We compare the net merger gain with the ac-
tualized innite ow of limit-pricing pseudo-duopoly prot. Let MLI(F; u; )
be the di¤erence between these payments. If MLI(F; u; ) is positive, then
the merger path is the Nash equilibrium of the game.
MLI(F; u; ) =
u
1    
1
8u
(1  )2  
2
p
2
p
Fu  2F
1   (37)
=
1
8(   1)2
h
( 16F   8u+ 16
p
2Fu) + 16F + 7u  16
p
2Fu
i
.
Let (F; u) be the  level for which MLI(F; u; ) = 0:
(F; u) =
16F + 7u  16p2Fu
16F + 8u  16p2Fu . (38)
Proposition 2 The entry deterrence by the limit-pricing strategy is the Nash
equilibrium of the game if  > (F; u). By contrast, the merger strategy is
the Nash equilibrium of the game if  < (F; u). Moreover, (F; u) (see
gure 2) is decreasing in F and 0:5 < (F; u) < 0:643 for the setup cost
values allowing the benchmark existence.
Proof. see appendix G.
Insert Figure 2
The interpretation of proposition 2 is as follows. There is a trade-o¤ be-
tween the two strategies that depends on the discount rate level. If this is low
( < (F; u)), it reduces the value of future payments in the merger path.
The merger tends to be more protable. If this is high ( > (F; u)), it raises
18
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the value of future payments in the merger path. The merger tends to be less
protable. Moreover, the higher the setup cost is, the lower the discount factor
threshold (F; u) is. Therefore, the area of protability of entry deterrence
increases. This is due to the fact that the increase in setup cost makes the de-
terrence of a generic competitor easier. Note also that if  > , the net merger
gain is non-positive and the entry deterrence strategy is always preferred. For
(F; u) <  < , the net merger gain is positive but not enough to o¤set
the protability of the entry deterrence strategy. For  < (F; u) < , the
net merger gain is positive and exceeds the entry deterrence gain.
5 Concluding remarks
The entry of generic drugs in the pharmaceutical market encourages brand-
name laboratories to use anti-competitive practices to stay in a monopolistic
industry. More precisely, this article analyzes two anti-competitive practices:
the "anticipated" merger strategy and the limit-pricing strategy. Each strategy
may be implemented with or without pseudo-generics production. This topic
is analyzed in a vertical di¤erentiation model, in which laboratories compete
à la Bertrant-Stackelberg. As to the protability of the two strategies, we
report the following ndings: rst, the entry deterrence is always preferable to
entry accommodation. This result must be qualied by the credibility problem
associated with the limit-pricing strategy. Secondly, "anticipated" merger is
preferable to entry deterrence depending on the setup cost level and on the
rate of discount level.
Three research perspectives appear in this simple model. First, we assume
a myopic generic rm. Taking into account a Bayesian reasoning to elabo-
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rate the limit-pricing strategy, as Milgrom and Roberts (1982), would rene
our results. Next, one of the results obtained is the mono-product monopoly
persistence. Nevertheless, an insurance market could incite the monopoly also
to produce pseudo-generics if we assume a non-covered drug market14. This
scenario would be closer to the empirical reality (e.g, Hollis, 2002, 2003).
Moreover, competition authorities could block the merger. However, taking
synergies into account could modify this decision, all the more so since the
monopoly may produce pseudo-generics. Finally, to explain the presence of
only one pseudo-generic product, we might consider the fact that the switching
cost from the brand to the generic drug decreases with generic proliferation.
This assumption could be endogenized in the model.
14To simplify the model, we ignore the insurance market. However, the higher incentive to
produce generics induced by an insurance market does not a¤ect qualitatively our trade-o¤
between mergers and entry deterrence.
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Appendix A
The generic rms reaction function is given by the rst order condition:
@Dg
@pg
=
@(
pb pg
u pg   F )
@pg
=
1
u
(pb   2pg) = 0. (A.1)
The generic rms prot function is concave in pg since the second order
condition is checked:
@2Dg
@p2g
=
@( 1u (pb   2pg))
@pg
=  2
u
< 0. (A.2)
Therefore, the generic rms reaction function is:
RF (pb) : pg(pb) =
pb
2
. (A.3)
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Thus, the brand-name rms prot can be rewritten:
Db = sbpb (A.4)
= (1  pb  
pb
2
u
)pb =   1
2u
 
p2b   2upb

.
The rst order condition of the brand-name rms prot function deter-
mines the branded good equilibrium price:
@Db
@pb
=
@(  12u
 
p2b   2upb

)
@pb
=
1
u
(u  pb) = 0. (A.5)
The second order condition holds since:
@2Db
@p2b
=
@( 1u (u  pb))
@pb
=  1
u
< 0. (A.6)
We deduce the following equilibrium prices and market shares:
pDb = u, (A.7)
pDg =
u
2
,
sDb = s
D
g =
1
2
.
Appendix B
Proceeding in the same way as in the appendix A, the brand-name rms prot
can be rewritten:
PDb = sbpb +
1
2
sgpg (B.1)
= (1  pb  
pb
2
u
)pb +
pb   pb2
2u
pb
2
=   1
8u
pb (3pb   8u) .
The price maximizing the prot function is:
pPDb =
4u
3
. (B.2)
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Condition (2) implies that pPDb  u, so,4u3 > u. As the prot function
is increasing and concave for pPDb <
4u
3 , we deduce the brand-name good
equilibrium price pPDb = u. We establish the following equilibrium prices and
market shares:
pPDb = u, (B.3)
pPDg =
u
2
,
sPDb = s
PD
g =
1
2
.
Appendix C
Proceeding in the same way as in the appendix A, the brand-name rms prot
can be rewritten:
Tb = sbpb (C.1)
= (1  pb  
pb
2
u
)pb =   1
2u
 
p2b   2upb

.
We deduce the following equilibrium prices and market shares:
pTb = u, (C.2)
pTg =
u
2
,
sTb = s
T
g =
1
2
.
Appendix D
Proceeding in the same way as in the appendix A, the brand-name rms prot
can be rewritten:
PTb = sbpb +
1
3
sgpg (D.1)
= (1  pb  
pb
2
u
)pb +
pb   pb2
3u
pb
2
=   1
12u
pb (5pb   12u) .
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The price maximizing the prot function is:
pPTb =
6u
5
. (D.2)
Condition (2) implies that pPTb  u, so,6u5 > u. As the prot function
is increasing and concave for pPTb <
4u
3 , we deduce the brand-name good
equilibrium price pPTb = u. We report the following equilibrium prices and
market shares:
pPTb = u, (D.3)
pPTg =
u
2
,
sPTb = s
PT
g =
1
2
.
Appendix E
LPDb  PDb = 2
p
2Fu  2F   2
p
Fu. (E.1)
This di¤erence is a trinomial admitting two roots:
F3 =
1
4
p
2(2
p
2 p3)u  516u ' 0:751u and F4 = 14
p
2(2
p
2+
p
3)u  516u '
1: 300u
The benchmark conditions are between these two roots. Therefore, we
obtain:
LPDb  PDb > 0. (E.2)
Appendix F
We study the sign of the net merger gain. We derive the net merger gain
function in .
@G(F; u; )
@
=
1
4
u
(   1)3 (4   3)
8>><>>:
> 0 pour  < 34 ,
< 0 pour  > 34 .
(F.1)
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Therefore, the net merger gain is increasing for  < 34 and decreasing for  >
3
4 . The net merger gain is equal to zero for 
 = 78 >
3
4 . As lim
!0+
G(F; u; ) =
7u
8 > 0, then G(F; u; ) > 0 for  < 
 and G(F; u; ) < 0 for  > .
Appendix G
We search for MLI(F; u; ) sign. This one is the same than the sign the
function numerator. Thus, we derive this numerator in .
@( 16F   8u+ 16p2Fu) + 16F + 7u  16p2Fu)
@
=  16F   8u+ 16
p
2Fu.
(G.1)
This derivative is a trinomial admitting two roots:
F5 =   u
16

4
p
2  9

' 0:209u, (G.2)
F6 =
u
16

4
p
2 + 9

' 0:916u.
The benchmark conditions imply the negativity of MLI(F; u; ) derivative
(in ). We compute the MLI(F; u; ) root in :
(F; u) =
16F + 7u  16p2Fu
16F + 8u  16p2Fu . (G.3)
Under the benchmark conditions, we study this root:
@((F; u))
@F
=  1
8
( 2pFu+p2u)u
2F + u  2p2Fu < 0 pour F 2
h u
12
;
u
8
i
. (G.4)
(F; u)F= u12 =
25u  4p24u
28u  4p24u ' 0:643 2 [0; 1] .
(F; u)F=u8 =
1
2
2 [0; 1] .
Under the benchmark conditions, (F; u) is decreasing in F from 0:643
(approximatively) to 12 . As 0 <
1
2 < 0:643 < 1, whatever the setup cost level,
there are discount factor values lower or higher than (F; u).
27
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Figure 2. Indi¤erence curve between entry deterrence and "anticipative" merger
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Extended appendices
Appendix A
The generic rms reaction function is given by the rst order condition:
@Dg
@pg
=
@(
pb pg
u pg   F )
@pg
=
1
u
(pb   2pg) = 0. (A.1)
The generic rms prot function is concave in pg since the second order
condition is checked:
@2Dg
@p2g
=
@( 1u (pb   2pg))
@pg
=  2
u
< 0. (A.2)
Therefore, the generic rms reaction function is:
RF (pb) : pg(pb) =
pb
2
. (A.3)
Thus, the brand-name rms prot can be rewritten:
Db = sbpb (A.4)
= (1  pb  
pb
2
u
)pb =   1
2u
 
p2b   2upb

.
The rst order condition of the brand-name rms prot function deter-
mines the branded good equilibrium price:
@Db
@pb
=
@(  12u
 
p2b   2upb

)
@pb
=
1
u
(u  pb) = 0. (A.5)
The second order condition holds since:
@2Db
@p2b
=
@( 1u (u  pb))
@pb
=  1
u
< 0. (A.6)
1
Page 30 of 36
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
We deduce the following equilibrium prices and market shares:
pDb = u, (A.7)
pDg =
u
2
,
sDb = s
D
g =
1
2
.
Appendix B
The generic rms reaction function is given by the rst order condition:
@PDg
@pg
=
@(
pb pg
2u pg   F )
@pg
=
1
2u
(pb   2pg) = 0. (B.1)
The generic rms prot function is concave in pg since the second order
condition is checked:
@2PDg
@p2g
=
@( 12u (pb   2pg))
@pg
=  1
u
< 0. (B.2)
Therefore, the generic rms reaction function is:
RF (pb) : pg(pb) =
pb
2
. (B.3)
Thus, the brand-name rms prot can be rewritten:
PDb = sbpb +
1
2
sgpg (B.4)
= (1  pb  
pb
2
u
)pb +
pb   pb2
2u
pb
2
=   1
8u
pb (3pb   8u) .
The rst order condition of the brand-name rms prot function deter-
mines the branded good equilibrium price:
@PDb
@pb
=
@(  18upb (3pb   8u))
@pb
=   1
4u
(3pb   4u) = 0. (B.5)
The second order condition holds since:
@2PDb
@p2b
=
@(  14u (3pb   4u))
@pb
=   3
4u
< 0. (B.6)
2
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Therefore, the price maximizing the prot function is:
pPDb =
4u
3
. (B.7)
Condition (2) implies that pPDb  u, so,4u3 > u. As the prot function
is increasing and concave for pPDb <
4u
3 , we deduce the brand-name good
equilibrium price pPDb = u. We establish the following equilibrium prices and
market shares:
pPDb = u, (B.8)
pPDg =
u
2
,
sPDb = s
PD
g =
1
2
.
Appendix C
The generic rmsreaction function is given by the rst order condition:
@Tg1
@pg
=
@Tg2
@pg
=
@(
pb pg
2u pg   F )
@pg
=
1
2u
(pb   2pg) . (C.1)
The generic rmsprot function is concave in pg since the second order
condition is checked:
@2Tg1
@p2g
=
@2Tg2
@p2g
=
@( 1u (pb   2pg))
@pg
=  2
u
< 0. (C.2)
Therefore, the generic rmsreaction function is:
RF (pb) : pg(pb) =
pb
2
. (C.3)
Thus, the brand-name rms prot can be rewritten:
Tb = sbpb (C.4)
= (1  pb  
pb
2
u
)pb =   1
2u
 
p2b   2upb

.
3
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The rst order condition of the brand-name rms prot function deter-
mines the branded good equilibrium price:
@Tb
@pb
=
@(  12u
 
p2b   2upb

)
@pb
=
1
u
(u  pb) = 0. (C.5)
The second order condition holds since:
@2Tb
@p2b
=
@( 1u (u  pb))
@pb
=  1
u
< 0. (C.6)
We deduce the following equilibrium prices and market shares:
pTb = u, (C.7)
pTg =
u
2
,
sTb = s
T
g =
1
2
.
Appendix D
The generic rmsreaction function is given by the rst order condition:
@PTg1
@pg
=
@PTg2
@pg
=
@(
pb pg
3u pg   F )
@pg
=
1
3u
(pb   2pg) = 0. (D.1)
The generic rmsprot functions are concave in pg since the second order
condition is checked:
@2PTg1
@p2g
=
@2PTg2
@p2g
=
@( 13u (pb   2pg))
@pg
=   2
3u
< 0. (D.2)
Therefore, the generic rmsreaction function is:
RF (pb) : pg(pb) =
pb
2
. (D.3)
Thus, the brand-name rms prot can be rewritten:
PTb = sbpb +
1
3
sgpg (D.4)
= (1  pb  
pb
2
u
)pb +
pb   pb2
3u
pb
2
=   1
12u
pb (5pb   12u) .
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The rst order condition of the brand-name rms prot function deter-
mines the branded good equilibrium price:
@PTb
@pb
=
@(  112upb (5pb   12u))
@pb
=   1
6u
(5pb   6u) = 0. (D.5)
The second order condition holds since:
@2PTb
@p2b
=
@(  16u (5pb   6u))
@pb
=   5
6u
< 0. (D.6)
Therefore, the price maximizing the prot function is:
pPTb =
6u
5
. (D.7)
Condition (2) implies that pPTb  u, so,6u5 > u. As the prot function
is increasing and concave for pPTb <
4u
3 , we deduce the brand-name good
equilibrium price pPTb = u. We report the following equilibrium prices and
market shares:
pPTb = u, (D.8)
pPTg =
u
2
,
sPTb = s
PD
g =
1
2
.
Appendix E
LPDb  PDb = 2
p
2Fu  2F   2
p
Fu. (E.1)
This di¤erence is a trinomial admitting two roots:
F3 =
1
4
p
2(2
p
2 p3)u  516u ' 0:751u and F4 = 14
p
2(2
p
2+
p
3)u  516u '
1: 300u
5
Page 34 of 36
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
The benchmark conditions are between these two roots. Therefore, we
obtain:
LPDb  PDb > 0. (E.2)
Appendix F
We study the sign of the net merger gain. We derive the net merger gain
function in .
@G(F; u; )
@
=
1
4
u
(   1)3 (4   3)
8>><>>:
> 0 pour  < 34 ,
< 0 pour  > 34 .
(F.1)
Therefore, the net merger gain is increasing for  < 34 and decreasing for  >
3
4 . The net merger gain is equal to zero for 
 = 78 >
3
4 . As lim
!0+
G(F; u; ) =
7u
8 > 0, then G(F; u; ) > 0 for  < 
 and G(F; u; ) < 0 for  > .
Appendix G
We search for MLI(F; u; ) sign. This one is the same than the sign the
function numerator. Thus, we derive this numerator in .
@( 16F   8u+ 16p2Fu) + 16F + 7u  16p2Fu)
@
=  16F   8u+ 16
p
2Fu.
(G.1)
This derivative is a trinomial admitting two roots:
F5 =   u
16

4
p
2  9

' 0:209u, (G.2)
F6 =
u
16

4
p
2 + 9

' 0:916u.
The benchmark conditions imply the negativity of MLI(F; u; ) derivative
(in ). We compute the MLI(F; u; ) root in :
(F; u) =
16F + 7u  16p2Fu
16F + 8u  16p2Fu . (G.3)
6
Page 35 of 36
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Under the benchmark conditions, we study this root:
@((F; u))
@
=  1
8
( 2pFu+p2u)u
2F + u  2p2Fu < 0 pour F 2
h u
12
;
u
8
i
. (G.4)
(F; u)F= u12 =
25u  4p24u
28u  4p24u = 0:643 2 [0; 1] .
(F; u)F=u8 =
1
2
2 [0; 1] .
Under the benchmark conditions, (F; u) is decreasing in F from 0:643
(approximatively) to 12 . As 0 <
1
2 < 0:643 < 1, whatever the setup cost level,
there are discount factor values lower or higher than (F; u).
7
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